Political comment
Joe Martin
As is customary, Chinese policy in the areas of climate change, summary justice in capital punishment, the jailing of writers, and the use of violence and torture in Tibet and against non-violent spiritual movements and religions is not based upon any form of logic, morality, or consistency in the law. This behavior is based upon two principles. The first is that China is too big and its momentum on the way to being a superpower too strong to have to bend to international norms. The second is that all criticism against Chinese policy from anyone in the West or developed world is irrelevant precisely because China is not yet a “developed nation” – and other nations polluted and suppressed indigenous peoples to become developed.
There are a few basic presumptions in this that are in fact widely accepted but based on dubious premises. The most common of these is the argument put forward by many so-called progressive and "pragmatic" advocates of third-world exceptionalism ever since the end of the colonial empires. This argument suggests that developing countries are unable to establish "thick" human rights norms— that is the term that is being bandied about. This terminology should invite ridicule in light of the moderate successes in building democracies in many developing countries, which have led to increased economic development. Brazil and India are examples that are hard to ignore.
One of the greatest historical proponents of this exceptionalism, in writings, speeches and interviews in the 1980s was Robert Mugabe, once a hero rather than the pariah he now is. His argument back then: Rather than striving toward democratic norms—one should strive "to have a one party state" if possible, as developing countries don't have the luxury of implementing "cake frosting" like human rights. It goes without saying, went the Mugabe argument, that strong human rights enforcement would drive development downhill. This is the same argument that has justified the MO of many African dictators. We have watched Mugabe over time turn into a monster—Bishop Tutu has said he had become a "Frankenstein"—as he methodically tried to follow the logic of this ideology until his economy went berserk, and he did too. Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka from Nigeria has taken much time off his literary work to criticize, in books and essays, this way of excusing the entrenchment of authoritarian law and tradition in the developing world.
The opposite argument is that it is never too early to keep moving toward structures that will bring increasing respect of human rights and democratic methods. India was a good example of this, perhaps because of the visions of Nehru—who leaned left, but believed in pluralistic Democracy –and Gandhi. Less unified than China, less militaristic, and extravagantly diverse, with a wildly free media India has had parallel success with that of China's (parallel but different, for sure). From a middle class which as late as 1980 was only 10% of the population, all the statistics point to a middle class that is no 50% of the population.
Granted -- that leaves up to 500 million poor and desperately poor in India. But the direction is right in economics, as well as individual rights. Military over-reactions aside—as in Kashmir, where the non-local military has in the past become engaged in the usual torture and assaults on a population which they see as collaborators with the enemy—the structures are in place for people to fight and win in the courts, to create new legislation promptly where abuses occur, and to at least challenge local bosses who engage in human rights abuses in a very public way.
So let's compare the two countries in the area of environmental issues. India has not posed nearly the same number of selfish roadblocks to the environmental treaties such as the Copenhagen as China has (Except for the US back in the day of the Kyoto conference). Aside from its pigheaded exploitation national pride to create a nuclear arsenal, the Indian government is at least open to refurbishing the economy with environmental industry if they can find the wherewithall. It is astonishing that, with a population that has burgeoned in tandem with China's, that it has continuously improved its difficult human rights issues, or at least showed the active will to do so.
The advocates of Third World exceptionalism in areas of human rights, democracy, and climate change, in general, are usually patronizing. They may raise interesting questions—but it has been a murderous ideology in practice. They have not been doing the people of these countries any favors.
Another interesting comparison we can make might be Egypt and Turkey. Both are "fallen" seats of powerful civilizations, even after the advent of Islam. Under Mubarak's "exceptionalist" rule—reinforced by a martial law that has lasted decades—the economy is as much a basket case as Egypt’s democracy and human rights record. Meanwhile, Turkey, in fits and starts, has shown tolerance for a multi-party system and has many savagely critical media outlets. The moderate Islamist Party which was allowed to take power, has finally brought a Prime Minster to sit down with the head of State in Armenia—after a century of denials about the Armenian genocide (Compare this with China on Tibet). The economic state of the population is well below most of Europe, but light years above Egypt.
The fact is, the world has changed since the now-developed world sloughed through the industrial revolution without a map, and the borders of nation states were drawn with blood. There are now many resources around for creating a lucrative industry that promotes sustainable development and supplies jobs. Most national borders in the world are established and mapped.
A new sort of Chinese farce will soon be replacing the Beijing Opera as the primary traditional performing art—if the Chinese ruling party insists on allying with genocidal regimes like that of Sudan at conferences designed to rescue the planet to stymie commitment to change that will prevent depletion of many countries water supplies, sink entire island nation states into the oceans, and keep entire nationalities such as the Tibetans and Uighers in a state of permanent repression and poverty.
Joe Martin
As is customary, Chinese policy in the areas of climate change, summary justice in capital punishment, the jailing of writers, and the use of violence and torture in Tibet and against non-violent spiritual movements and religions is not based upon any form of logic, morality, or consistency in the law. This behavior is based upon two principles. The first is that China is too big and its momentum on the way to being a superpower too strong to have to bend to international norms. The second is that all criticism against Chinese policy from anyone in the West or developed world is irrelevant precisely because China is not yet a “developed nation” – and other nations polluted and suppressed indigenous peoples to become developed.
There are a few basic presumptions in this that are in fact widely accepted but based on dubious premises. The most common of these is the argument put forward by many so-called progressive and "pragmatic" advocates of third-world exceptionalism ever since the end of the colonial empires. This argument suggests that developing countries are unable to establish "thick" human rights norms— that is the term that is being bandied about. This terminology should invite ridicule in light of the moderate successes in building democracies in many developing countries, which have led to increased economic development. Brazil and India are examples that are hard to ignore.
One of the greatest historical proponents of this exceptionalism, in writings, speeches and interviews in the 1980s was Robert Mugabe, once a hero rather than the pariah he now is. His argument back then: Rather than striving toward democratic norms—one should strive "to have a one party state" if possible, as developing countries don't have the luxury of implementing "cake frosting" like human rights. It goes without saying, went the Mugabe argument, that strong human rights enforcement would drive development downhill. This is the same argument that has justified the MO of many African dictators. We have watched Mugabe over time turn into a monster—Bishop Tutu has said he had become a "Frankenstein"—as he methodically tried to follow the logic of this ideology until his economy went berserk, and he did too. Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka from Nigeria has taken much time off his literary work to criticize, in books and essays, this way of excusing the entrenchment of authoritarian law and tradition in the developing world.
The opposite argument is that it is never too early to keep moving toward structures that will bring increasing respect of human rights and democratic methods. India was a good example of this, perhaps because of the visions of Nehru—who leaned left, but believed in pluralistic Democracy –and Gandhi. Less unified than China, less militaristic, and extravagantly diverse, with a wildly free media India has had parallel success with that of China's (parallel but different, for sure). From a middle class which as late as 1980 was only 10% of the population, all the statistics point to a middle class that is no 50% of the population.
Granted -- that leaves up to 500 million poor and desperately poor in India. But the direction is right in economics, as well as individual rights. Military over-reactions aside—as in Kashmir, where the non-local military has in the past become engaged in the usual torture and assaults on a population which they see as collaborators with the enemy—the structures are in place for people to fight and win in the courts, to create new legislation promptly where abuses occur, and to at least challenge local bosses who engage in human rights abuses in a very public way.
So let's compare the two countries in the area of environmental issues. India has not posed nearly the same number of selfish roadblocks to the environmental treaties such as the Copenhagen as China has (Except for the US back in the day of the Kyoto conference). Aside from its pigheaded exploitation national pride to create a nuclear arsenal, the Indian government is at least open to refurbishing the economy with environmental industry if they can find the wherewithall. It is astonishing that, with a population that has burgeoned in tandem with China's, that it has continuously improved its difficult human rights issues, or at least showed the active will to do so.
The advocates of Third World exceptionalism in areas of human rights, democracy, and climate change, in general, are usually patronizing. They may raise interesting questions—but it has been a murderous ideology in practice. They have not been doing the people of these countries any favors.
Another interesting comparison we can make might be Egypt and Turkey. Both are "fallen" seats of powerful civilizations, even after the advent of Islam. Under Mubarak's "exceptionalist" rule—reinforced by a martial law that has lasted decades—the economy is as much a basket case as Egypt’s democracy and human rights record. Meanwhile, Turkey, in fits and starts, has shown tolerance for a multi-party system and has many savagely critical media outlets. The moderate Islamist Party which was allowed to take power, has finally brought a Prime Minster to sit down with the head of State in Armenia—after a century of denials about the Armenian genocide (Compare this with China on Tibet). The economic state of the population is well below most of Europe, but light years above Egypt.
The fact is, the world has changed since the now-developed world sloughed through the industrial revolution without a map, and the borders of nation states were drawn with blood. There are now many resources around for creating a lucrative industry that promotes sustainable development and supplies jobs. Most national borders in the world are established and mapped.
A new sort of Chinese farce will soon be replacing the Beijing Opera as the primary traditional performing art—if the Chinese ruling party insists on allying with genocidal regimes like that of Sudan at conferences designed to rescue the planet to stymie commitment to change that will prevent depletion of many countries water supplies, sink entire island nation states into the oceans, and keep entire nationalities such as the Tibetans and Uighers in a state of permanent repression and poverty.
POSTING FROM ANDREW HALPER
ReplyDeleteA CHINA MORE JUST: My Fight as a Rights Lawyer in the World’s Largest Communist State
GAO ZHISHENG
San Diego, CA: Broad Press, 2007
xii + 255 pp. $14.95
Reading this cri de coeur by crusading lawyer and devout Christian Gao Zhisheng is like watching a road accident take place in slow-motion. We know how it will end (messily, tragically), but cannot look away. Indeed, this is a messy book – it is a patchwork of uncritically passionate religious–ethical exhortation veering into selfcongratulatory
heroism, underlain by a hatred of the Party expressed so uncompromisingly that one can only conclude Gao must have actively sought an
ennobling martyrdom consonant with his religious convictions. But in casting light –
even if an unrelentingly harsh light – on the human rights situation in China, itmakes for a provocative foil to the more positive gloss often put on current developments in the country.
Born in 1964 into dire poverty in a Shaanxi cave and raised after his father’s untimely death by a mother whom he describes as saintly and self-sacrificing, Gao spent three years in the PLA. After demobilization he embarked on a self-study law course and against improbable odds qualified as a Chinese lawyer. Setting up
practice in Urumqi, he made a national name for himself by taking seemingly hopeless cases of dispossessed peasants and city dwellers, victims of the negative aspects of the rural and urban development which has swept like a disfiguring whirlwind through China’s cities and countryside in the past 15 years. Maimed
children, medical malpractice victims, cheated villagers, forcibly removed pensioners
– these were his clients, and his apparent successes in defending their interests against
the depredations of corrupt officials and society’s cold indifference earned him
official accolades and awards, the implication being that by fighting venal local officials in court, he bolstered the Central government’s credibility by helping
reinforce the impression that it, unlike many local authorities, stands for justice.
Until his law practice was effectively shut down by the authorities a couple of years
ago, Gao appears to have been an effective advocate of the underdog, rather surprisingly given the endemic and systemic problems in the justice system which he adumbrates. In a number of sometimes self-congratulatory passages, he cites his many successes in obtaining justice for victims, and getting power-holders to realize the error of their ways.
The book is shot through with romanticidealism of a sort which is readily recognizable to students of modern Chinese history. Gao tells us that when he became a lawyer, ‘‘I thought that the government was bound to support me in my quest to uphold justice’’ (p. 46). But the Constitution, he learned, was ‘‘just empty
words.’’ Repeatedly he bemoans the cruelty and rapacity of the authorities – where, he asks, is their humanity and decency?
In describing his dedication to law studies, Gao likens himself to mythical culturehero
Yu the Great. When preparing for his xams, ‘‘I often got up early and practiced lecturing to a wheat field. The stalks were my examiners’’ (p. 13).
All this makes for a stark contrast to his repeated descriptions of the Party as a group of gangsters, wolves and thieves.
His criticism of the Party deepens over time, but is not leavened by a consideration
of the way that Party–society interaction has also changed over time. Maoist madness, Dengist liberalization – there really is no difference for Gao. Nothing changes and nothing will change until the ruling clique which ‘‘seized power’’ in 1949 is ousted or – more characteristically for a writer who opts for moralism rather than analysis – until they come to their senses, feel shame for their actions and mend their ways.
Continued next comment ...
A CHINA MORE JUST continued from last comment
ReplyDeletePosting from Andrew Halper
‘‘The crux of the matter is the abuse of power’’, Gao tells us (p. 57). ‘‘There is
nothing unusual about the state abusing its power in our country – it’s been like this
ever since day one of the current regime. The miseries that Chinese people havesuffered due to the abuse of state power are too numerous to record.’’ Moreover, ‘‘our country operates without any regulations, or, put another way, regulations are routinely disregarded and abused. People’s rights and interests are incessantly violated. Government officials are greedy and shameless, the law enforcement
personnel break the law, an independent judiciary is non-existent, and society as a
whole is dishonest and immoral’’ (p. 39). Nor is he indulgent towards his fellow Chinese lawyers, notwithstanding that they may be bit players in a system not of their making. ‘‘China’s lawyers are just like dogs, wagging their tails and begging for food from the corrupt judicial authorities’’ (p. 46).
Despite his early successes as a lawyer, Gao’s fortunes turned for the worse a few years ago, when – incensed, he tells us, by the government’s cavalier attitude towards the Constitution – he added falun gong (FLG) adherents to his client roster.
The oppression and torture of imprisoned FLG members as searingly recounted atlength by Gao appear to have really radicalized him, transforming him from a merely harsh critic of the Government into a self-declared enemy of the Party-State, and thus Gao Zhisheng crossed his Rubicon. Although he asserts he is Christian and does not appear to be a practitioner of FLG, he lauds its adherents as representing the best in contemporary Chinese society. His views ultimately led him to seek to organize rotating hunger strikes, in effect employing organizational tactics not dissimilar to the surprise ‘‘sit-down’’ demonstrations staged by FLG and which so
unnerved the Central Government a few years ago.
What is puzzling about the book, however, is what is missing. Despite the many years he spent in Xinjiang, and his high sensitivity to any whiff of official misdeed, Gao has nothing at all to say about the situation facing any of China’s more restive minority peoples, nor for that matter about the plight of migrant labourers.
Gao Zhisheng has written a morality tale which is both an apologia pro sua vita and a call to arms, albeit a non-violent one. Once the reader grasps (within the first few pages) that Gao is on a collision course with a Party he despises and which he is determined to push as hard as he can, the fatal outcome becomes clear, even for readers who did not know that after several years of official harassment, trial and house arrest, he disappeared into police custody in late 2007 and remains
unaccounted for to date by the authorities. An exasperated PRC Government has finally silenced a turbulently implacable opponent.